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Lockup Agreements and Survival of UK
IPOs
WASIM AHMAD AND RANKO JELIC∗
Abstract: This paper examines the role of lockup agreements on the survival of 580 UK
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) during the period of 1990–2011. Our accelerated failure time
(AFT) survival model shows a statistically and economically significant effect of lockup length
on the post-IPO survival. A 12 month increase in median lockup period increases the (median)
survival time by 27%. Furthermore, the failure rates for IPOs with longer lockups are consistently
lower than the failure rates for IPOs with shorter lockups regardless of delisting reasons. The
results are robust to choice of different survival estimation models, heterogeneity, clustering,
and alternative specification of variables. Our results highlight the importance of lockup
characteristics on the subsequent survival of newly listed firms and inform recent debate
regarding alleged short-termism in the UK equity market. (Paper received February, 2013;
revised version accepted December, 2013).
Keywords: IPOs, lockups, survival, going private, private equity
1. INTRODUCTION
Lockups prevent firms’ insiders from selling whole or some percentage of their equity
during post-IPO periods. Existing literature shows that the majority of US and UK
firms go public with voluntary lockups (Espenlaub et al., 2001; Field and Hanka, 2001;
Mohan and Chen, 2001; Hoque, 2011) and tends to focus on roles of lockups and
their price effect around expiry dates (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Brau et al., 2004;
Arthurs et al., 2009; Yung and Zender, 2010). Although IPOs’ survival has been studied
before (Jain and Kini, 2000, 2008), the association of the survival and characteristics
of lockups has not received attention in the past.1 We extend the literature by studying
the relationship between lockup length and long term performance (i.e., survival)
∗Wasim Ahmad is from the Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University, UK. Ranko Jelic
is from the University of Birmingham, Business School – Department of Finance, UK. The authors would
like to thank an anonymous referee, Martin Walker (Editor), participants at the 2012 European Financial
Management Association Doctoral Colloquium in Barcelona and Research Seminars at the University of
Birmingham Business School for helpful comments and suggestions.
Address for correspondence: Ranko Jelic, University of Birmingham, Business School – Department of
Finance, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK. e-mail: r.jelic@bham.ac.uk
1 Jain and Kini (2000; 2008), for example, examine the impact of strategic investment decisions and the
presence of venture capital on the survival profile of US IPO firms. Prior literature has also identified firm
survival in the long term as a consistent measure of firm performance and a prerequisite of success in other
terms such as market share and profitability (Sua´rez and Utterback, 1995; Welbourne and Andrews, 1996;
Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005).
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of 580 IPOs from the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) Main Market, during the
period of January 1990 to December 2011. The innovative aspect of our study is also a
separate examination of longevity and probability of post-IPO failure. The importance
of length of lockup periods for the probability of survival was examined using
an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) survival model. We further make a distinction
between “positive” (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) and “negative” (e.g., failures)
reasons for delistings and control for alternative signalling mechanisms utilized by IPO
firms.
The examination of the relationship between lockups and survival for IPOs from
the LSE Main Market is important for several reasons. First, the LSE is the leading
European and one of the world’s largest stock markets.2 Second, in contrast to some
markets such as France, Germany (Goergen et al., 2006a) and Singapore (Chong and
Ho, 2007) lockups are completely voluntary for Main Market IPOs.3 The LSE Main
Market, therefore, provides an excellent setting for testing the relationship between
lockups and firm survival which might not have been relevant in the case of coun-
tries/markets with compulsory lockups. Third, lockups for LSE IPOs are quite diverse
and heterogeneous particularly in terms of their length. For example, Espenlaub et al.
(2001) report average lockup length of 561 days whilst Hoque (2011) reports variation
from 383 to 714 days for UK IPOs. This is in sharp contrast to the US findings of
standardised lockups of 180 days (Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003;
Brau et al., 2004; Yung and Zender, 2010). The diversity of lockup length in Main
Market IPOs allows us to examine the role of lockups in IPO survival which would not
have been possible in markets with short and/or standardised lockups. Fourth, recent
government (Kay, 2012) and industry (BBC, 2013; Deloitte, 2013) reports expressed
concerns regarding short-termism of UK listed companies. The alleged short-termism
fails to create incentives for long-term performance improvements. Kay (2012), for
example, recommends that directors’ remuneration should be linked to long-term
performance and incentives should be provided in the form of company shares locked-
in until director’s retirement. More recently, some of the leading institutional investors
in European companies argue in favour of lengthening incentive schemes in order to
promote the companies’ investments and prevent short-termism.4 Examination of the
relationship between various incentive schemes and longevity is thus important for
informing the above debate.
We argue that the length of lockup at the time of going public has the potential
to influence the post-issue survival as a listed company. Longer lockups expose firms’
insiders to significant illiquidity and non-diversification costs in the post-IPO period.
Consequently, only insiders of better quality firms with strong survival prospects will
be willing to commit to longer lockups whilst insiders in low quality firms will avoid
lengthy lockups. In addition, lockups force “insiders to not only put their money where
their mouth is but to keep it there as well” (Brau et al., 2005). In this way, lockups work
2 In 2005, LSE saw 354 IPOs with offering value of €18.6 billion. This was more than the combined volume
of all US exchanges in the same year. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006).
3 In the LSE’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), lockups have been compulsory for certain IPO firms
since 2000. For example, IPO firms on AIM which have not been independent and/or have not reported
earning revenues for at least 2 years are required to have 1 year lockups for related directors, substantial
shareholders and their associates and employees (AIM Rule 7).
4 For example, Fidelity Worldwide Investment announced that it would start voting against management
compensation plans unless companies’ executives would commit to hold shares longer than 3 years before
cashing them in (BBC, 24th September 2013).
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as a commitment mechanism to reduce agency problems and managerial incentives
of shirking and consumption, leading to increased firm performance and survival in
the aftermarket. Hence, longer lockups are likely to positively affect the survival of
IPOs. Our analysis is related to Bharath and Dittmar (2010) who find that some of the
variables (available at the time of IPOs) can predict which firms are more likely to go
private.
Our results suggest an increasing popularity of lockups with clearly defined lockup
periods in terms of a calendar date, rather than in relation to various corporate events.
The sample IPO lockup periods range from 2 to 41 months with a mean (median) of
15.39 (13) months. The median sample IPO survival period was 92 months, with 69%
surviving for at least 5 years. Our analysis highlights the importance of the length of
lockup periods for the survival of issuing firms. For example, a 12 month increase
in median lockup period increases the (median) survival period by 24 months. The
results of our survival model confirm positive and statistically significant association of
the survival rates and lockup period. Overall, the results of our study are in line with
the recent calls from both regulators and investment industry for lengthier incentive
schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a
summary of the related literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data
and methodology. Section 4 presents results of the survival analysis. In section 5, we
test for robustness of our results and perform some further analysis. Finally, section 6
concludes the paper.
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
(i) Lockups and Survival
The extant literature on the motivations for use of lockups suggests that lockups signal
issuing firm’s quality and serve as a “commitment device” (Brav and Gompers, 2003;
Brau et al., 2005; Goergen et al., 2006b). For example, lockup puts a penalty on inside
managers for hiding negative information about firm value and serves as a bonding
mechanism to regulate the actions of insiders. High quality firms with better growth
prospects and survival may not find longer lockup periods problematic. On the other
hand, firms with marginal prospects and low quality may not afford to have such
longer lockups because their poor quality will be revealed during that period before
the insiders can cash out. Brav and Gompers (2003) and Yung and Zender (2010),
for example, suggest that better quality US firms are likely to accept longer lockups
to alleviate the problem of moral hazard subsequent to the IPO. Similarly, Arthurs
et al. (2009) suggest that lockup periods tend to be used when other quality signals
(e.g., venture capital (VC) backing, more reputable sponsors, etc.) are not available.
In addition to the signalling effect, the longer length of the lockup period may be
beneficial for strategic managerial decisions (e.g., extent of R&D spending, capital
expenditure, advertising and expansion) made during the early post-IPO period (Jain
and Kini, 2009; Chandy and Sivasubramaniam, 2011). The above decisions ultimately
affect the performance and the survival of IPOs in the long run. Thus, we expect a
positive association of IPOs’ survival and length of lockup period.
C© 2014 The Authors
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(ii) Alternative Signalling Mechanisms
The previous US evidence suggests a positive role of VC backing (Megginson and
Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 2000), underwriters’ reputation (Carter and Manaster,
1990; Bhattacharya et al., 2013) and initial returns (Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al.,
1997; Demers and Joos, 2007) on the subsequent performance and survival of IPO
firms. Studies on UK IPOs, however, have largely failed to find significant differences
between private equity (PE) and non-PE backed IPOs in terms of their post-issue
performance (Jelic et al., 2005; Coakley et al., 2007; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Espenlaub
et al., 2012). Espenlaub et al. (2012) fail to find significant impact of initial returns on
survival of AIM IPOs but report that IPOs sponsored by reputed Nomads (sponsors)
on the UK’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) survive longer compared to those
backed by other Nomads.
Evidence regarding impact of insider ownership on post-issue performance and
survival of IPOs is also mixed. Consistent with Leland and Pyle’s (1977) prediction, Jain
and Kini (1994) find a positive relationship between managerial ownership retention
and post-issue operating performance. Similarly, Hensler et al. (1997) and Jain and
Kini (2008) find a positive impact of higher insider ownership on survival of US IPOs.
Goergen and Renneboog (2007), howevever, conclude that long-term performance of
IPOs is not correlated with UK IPOs’ retained ownership. Overall, the evidence on the
importance of alternative signalling mechanisms on IPO survival is inconclusive. Their
association with the IPO survival will be, therefore, determined empirically.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
(i) Data and Sample Construction
Panel A, of Table 1, describes the filters we use to construct our final sample of
IPOs. For example, we exclude investment trusts, venture capital trusts (VCTs),
privatisations, re-admissions, non-UK firms and firms with missing data and IPO
prospectuses. The above exercise resulted in 580 IPOs from the LSE Official List
between January 1990 and December 2006.5
As noted earlier, survival as an independent public listed company (PLC) is a
necessary condition of success for firms that went public in order to finance their
growth prospects.6 Being public enhances both the credibility and reputation of a
firm and improves its ability to hire key managers through incentives such as stock
options (Bancel and Mittoo, 2009). Similarly, other stakeholders (e.g. board members
and executives, underwriters, auditors, brokers, legal advisors etc.) have their interests
linked with the continued listing of a firm on the stock market (Espenlaub et al.,
2012). We, therefore, define survivors as IPO firms which remain listed on the stock
5 For IPOs between 1990 and 1997, we use Thomson One Banker and Perfect Filings databases. The data
for IPO activity from 1998–2006 were obtained from the LSE website.
6 For example, public listings provide firms with better access to capital markets, visibility within the
investment community, higher liquidity and pricing efficiency and are also ssociated with lower borrowing
cost. Listings (i.e., IPOs) represent the most critical benchmark of a company’s operating performance (Hsu
et al., 2010). For the above reasons, going public is often seen as a rite of passage in the life-cycle of a young
successful firm (Ritter, 1991).
C© 2014 The Authors
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max
Lockup Period (Months) 15.391 13.000 6.213 2.000 41.000
Size (£ millions) 259.157 64.726 712.280 1.050 7,725.000
Age (Years) 17.360 11.000 18.172 1.000 102.000
Initial Returns (%) 11.176 6.935 18.994 −51.880 139.100
Insider Ownership (%) 24.705 19.790 21.609 0.000 80.900
Sponsor Reputation (%) 2.991 2.080 3.211 0.000 15.380
Hot Issue Returns (%) 13.322 11.590 10.310 −14.430 64.420
Leverage 0.370 0.351 0.233 0.000 1.398
PEVC 0.514 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Note:
This table presents descriptive statistics of sample firms. All variables are defined in Table 1.
exchange as long as the benefits of listing are greater than the cost of remaining listed.7
When costs outweigh the benefits, firms can completely delist (i.e., go private) and
become private thus expecting lower costs (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). Going private
firms were classified as non-survivors and included in the sub-sample of acquired
companies.8 Another possibility for UK IPOs, in cases where costs outweigh the
benefits, is to transfer to the second tier market with the ability to raise additional
capital at significantly lower costs.9 Consistent with previous literature (Espenlaub
et al., 2012, Vismara et al., 2012) these firms are classified as survivors.
Based on the above criteria, we established and traced survival of our sample IPOs
up to December 2011. The dates and reasons of delisting of IPOs are obtained from
the London Share Price Database (LSPD). The dates and delisting reasons of sample
IPOs are further cross-referenced with the Perfect Filings database. We hand collect
the following variable directly from IPO prospectuses: lockup information, sponsors,
insider ownership, incorporation date, market capitalisation, industry and private
equity (PE) or VC backing. For relative expiry lockups, we use Perfect Filings to find
the corporate announcement dates and the exact lockup expiry.10 The data for initial
returns are obtained from Datastream. All variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1.
Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics. Out of the sample IPOs, 517 (89%)
have lockups in place for at least one class of shareholder. The average lockup
period of the sample IPOs is 15.39 months (468 days), measured as number of
7 We acknowledge that survival as a public company might not be the ultimate aim of firms going public.
IPOs may represent the first stage in the sale of a firm by establishing the market value of shares. Firms also
engage in IPO with a view to being taken over (Zingales, 1995). However, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to infer the intent to sell from at the time of listing. What is directly observable, however, are the reasons
for listings stated in IPO prospectuses. The majority of firms, for example, state that the main reason for
listing is to raise money (Kim and Weisbach, 2008) which is consistent with our definition of survival (i.e.,
continued listing).Unreported results suggest (as expected) that the ability to raise new capital was the most
frequently stated reason for listings in IPO prospectuses.
8 Going private transactions are normally completed via management buy-outs, tender offers and acqui-
sitions by financial institutions (see Borden and Yunis, 2007). Treating mergers and acquisitions as non-
survivors is consistent with previous literature (see Jain and Kini, 2000).
9 In the US, firms would have yet another choice. For example, they can also exit mandatory disclosure
while continue to be publicly traded (i.e., go dark) (see Leuz et al., 2008).
10 In case of relative lockup expiry, the expiry date of lockup is specified in relation to other company
events like announcement of results, publication of accounts etc. (Espenlaub et al., 2001).
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months from IPO date until the lockup expiry date. The lockup length, however,
varies considerably among sample firms with a minimum lockup of 2 months and a
maximum of 41 months. This clearly shows the large diversity and non-standardisation
of lockup length among the UK issuers. The average size (market capitalisation) of
IPO firms at the time of listing is £259.16 million. There is also a large variation in
terms of the market capitalisation of IPOs with a minimum of just £1.05 million and
a maximum of £7,725 million. Firms list with an average age of 17.36 years at the
time of IPO.11 The issuing firms exhibit average initial returns of 11.18% during the
sample period. The sample firms go public with insiders holding an average (median)
of 24.71% (19.79%) of the post-IPO equity stakes. The average sponsor market share
as a percentage of total sponsorship by IPO numbers is 2.99% with a maximum of
15.38%. More than half (51.4%) of the IPO firms are backed by PE or VC. The average
initial return of all the IPOs in the 3 months prior to the firm’s IPO month is 13.32%.
The highest average initial return of 64.42% is experienced in the first quarter of year
2000. The mean leverage ratio for the sample firms is 0.37.
(ii) Methodology
Survival analysis is preferred over the conventional statistical methods (e.g., ordinary
least square (OLS), binary dependent variable models etc.) due to a number of
benefits. For example, OLS regression cannot handle the censored observations,
which is a unique characteristic of survival data (Jenkins, 2005). Censoring occurs
when the event of interest (delisting of IPOs) has not yet occurred by the end of
study or experiment. In our case, sample IPOs which are still trading (listed) by the
end of December 2011 are right censored. Moreover, the binary dependent regression
models (logit, probit etc.) do not take into account the timing of the events. On the
other hand, survival analysis not only allows for censoring and different time horizons,
it can also handle the time dependent variables.
The survival rates of the sample IPOs are estimated using the Kaplan-Meier (KM)
method. The KM estimator is a non-parametric maximum likelihood method and is
defined as (see Clark et al., 2003)
S(t j) = S(t j−1)
(
1−dj
nj
)
, (1)
Where S(t j) is the probability of being listed at time (month) tj , S(t j−1) is the
probability of being listed at time tj−1, nj is the number of IPOs listed just before the
time tj (also called risk set at tj), dj is the number of IPOs delisted at time tj .
We use log rank test for testing the statistical differences in KM survival curves
between various groups (across issue years and industries) and sub-samples (lockup
length). We also compare the median survival times across different groups and sub-
samples. Median survival time is the point in time at which survival probability is
0.5 (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). Clark et al. (2003) state that median survival time
is the widely used measure instead of mean as survival data are often skewed and
rarely normally distributed. In the context of our analysis, median survival time is the
11 Age is defined as number of years between the IPO date and the date the company was established. We
take company establishment date as reported in the “introduction/historical background” section of the
prospectus.
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time in months when cumulative survival rate for sample IPOs has dropped to 50%
(i.e., half of the IPOs have been delisted). Following Espenlaub et al. (2012), we use
minimum survival time when the median survival time cannot be estimated (i.e., when
cumulative survival rate stays above 50% by the end of study period).
We evaluate the suitability of survival models with constant hazard rates (semi-
parametric and non-parametric) and those models that allow the hazard to change
over time (parametric). Based on the unreported results of different graphical
methods and tests, we find that the constant hazard assumption does not hold for
our data and therefore parametric models are preferred. Our survival model is
implemented in the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) form, which assumes that the
effect of predictors is multiplicative on the survival time. The model is commonly
expressed in log-linear form with respect to survival time as:
Ln(T j) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + · · · + βpXp + εj (2)
where β0, . . . , βp are parameters to be estimated, X1, . . . ,Xp are covariates, and εj is the
error term with a specific distributional form which determines the regression model.
AFT models being the parametric models require specific underlying distribution
(i.e., Weibull, Gamma, lognormal etc.). Unreported results for Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC) identify lognormal as themost appropriate distribution with the lowest
AIC value.12 We estimate the following specific model where natural logarithm of the
time to delist (survival time) is presented as a linear function of the covariates:
Ln(T j) = β0 + β1LockupPeriod + β2Ln(Size) + β3Ln(Age) + β4InitialReturns
+β5InsideOwnership + β6SponsorReputation + β7HotIssueReturns
+β8Leverage + β9PEVC + β10IndustryDummies + εj
(3)
Where Ln(T j) is natural logarithm of time to delisting or survival time and
covariates are as defined in Table 1 (Panel B). Lockup Period is the length of lockup
measured in months from date of IPO to lockup expiry date. Ln (Size) is the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO at offering price in £millions. Ln (Age) is
natural logarithm of the number of years between IPO date and the date the company
was established. Initial Return is the difference of first day closing price and offer price
as a percentage of offer price. Insider Ownership is the percentage of post-IPO equity
retained by the firms’ insiders. Sponsor Reputation for each sponsor is measured as the
number of IPOs sponsored in the year prior to the IPO as a percentage of total IPOs in
that year. PEVC is a dummy variable coded one for IPOs backed by PE or VC, and zero
otherwise. Hot Issue Returns is a proxy for market hotness and is defined as the average
of initial returns of all IPOs issued in the 3 months prior to the month of IPO. Leverage
is the ratio of total liabilities divided by the sum of total assets and IPO proceeds.
We include dummies for industry sectors based on the FTSE Global Classification as
outlined in Table 1 (Panel B).13
Size, age, leverage, industry and market conditions were identified in the previous
literature as important for IPO survival. Large firms, for example, have less valuation
12 For more on use of AIC to distinguish between different non-nested parametric models, see Allison
(2010).
13 A correlation matrix with all variables is provided in Appendix Table A1.
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uncertainty (Brav and Gompers, 2003) and better resources to cope with poor market
conditions compared to the small IPOs (Hensler et al., 1997). Larger IPOs, therefore,
are likely to have better survival and probability of delisting is inversely related to the
IPO size (Schultz, 1993). Similarly, Schultz (1993) shows that probability of failure
decreases with increasing age and Demers and Joos (2007) find that younger (less
established) firms are more likely to fail. Industry effect on the performance and
survival of IPOs has also been documented in the previous literature (Ritter, 1991;
Hensler et al., 1997; Hamza and Kooli, 2010; Carpentier and Suret, 2011). Hensler
et al. (1997), for example, observe shorter survival times for IPOs in computer,
wholesale, restaurant and airline industries. Firms with higher levels of debt are
more likely to accept mergers or being taken over in order to avoid bankruptcy
(Loderer et al., 2009). Consistent with these predictions, a number of studies have
reported that IPO firms with higher leverage are more likely to delist (Demers and
Joos, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2010). Finally, previous evidence suggests a negative
relationship between hot market periods and IPO survival (consistent with the window
of opportunity theory, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). We, therefore,
control for the above variables when examining importance of lockups for the survival
of IPO firms.
4. RESULTS
(i) Characteristics of Sample Firms and Lockups
In Table 3, we provide the number and percentage of sample IPOs by PEVC backing
(Panel A), type of lockup (Panel B) and summary statistics for lockup length across the
sample years (Panel C). Panel A of Table 3 shows that the proportion of PEVC backed
IPOs ranges from 40% to 66% during years 1990–2000 except for year 1990 when it
was 33%. Starting from year 2001 onwards, however, the proportion of PEVC backed
IPOs remains relatively higher with a peak of 94% in year 2004. Panel B of Table 3
shows the types of lockup agreement between the firms’ insiders and the underwriters
at the time of IPO. We distinguish between lockups with absolute date expiry, relative
date expiry and a combination of both types. The lockups in the case of absolute date
expiry are set in terms of clear calendar dates or a certain period of time after the
IPO and usually give the exact length of the lockup period. The relative date expiry
lockups, on the other hand, specify the expiry in relation to some corporate events
like preliminary results announcements or publication of company accounts etc.14
The third type is a combination of the two lockup types (e.g., some directors have
relative expiry and others have absolute expiry). The combinations also include cases
of lockups with multiple expiry dates.15 Panel B shows a clear break-point between the
use of absolute and relative expiry lockups in pre- and post-year 2000. Firms in the
14 We first collect the type of relative event (corporate announcement) of relative date lockups from the
IPO prospectus and then use Perfect Filings Database to find the exact date of that event to find the length
of lockup period.
15 The staggered or lockups with multiple expiry dates could be specified in both absolute and relative
lockups. An absolute date lockup with multiple expiry dates has been classified as an absolute lockup for
the purposes of Table 3. Similarly, a relative date lockup with multiple expiry dates has been classified as a
relative lockup. Following Espenlaub et al. (2001), we have taken the earliest expiry date for the analysis in
case of staggered lockups.
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period 1990–99, largely use relative expiry lockups which range from 33% to 95% of
all lockups types. However, the use of absolute expiry lockups picks up from year 2000
onwards and firms increasingly use absolute lockups or a combination of both. For
example 75% of the lockups in each of years 2005 and 2006 are absolute expiry while
this proportion is 100% in year 2003. Panel C of Table 3 provides summary statistics
for lockup lengths across sample years. Lockups are quite heterogeneous with varying
levels of dispersion in their length over the sample period. Reported annual average
(mean) lockup length is ranging from 12.2 (1990) to 18.5 (2001) months. Annual
standard deviation of the lockups’ length also varies substantially from 0.41 (1990)
to 7.79 (2006) months. Notably, popularity of 12 month lockups has increased since
2003.
(ii) Longevity and Survival Rates
Table 4 reports 1 to 5 year cumulative survival rates and median survival times of
sample IPOs across listing years (Panel A) and industry of issuing firms (Panel B).16
The survival rates across listing years vary considerably. One year survival rates remain
100% except for years 1994, 1999 and 2000. Firms listed in year 2000 experience the
lowest 5 year survival rates and 50% of the IPOs are delisted by their fifth anniversary.
Firms listed in years 2002 and 1991 have the highest survival rates at 93% and 89%,
respectively. However, the differences in survival rates across years are statistically
insignificant. The survival rates across industries show relatively less variation with a
minimum 5 year survival rate of 62% for Non-Cyclical Services. The Resources sector
enjoys the highest 5 year survival rate of 76%. However, the differences in survival rates
across industries are not statistically significant.
The median survival time for our sample IPOs is 92 months (i.e., half of the IPOs
survive for 92 months or less). The median survival time, however, varies substantially
across the listing years. For example, the median survival time is lowest for IPOs issued
in year 2001 and longest for firms listed in year 1991. The shortest longevity was
reported for years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Comparison of the median survival time
across industries shows that the “Resources” sector enjoys the highest survival time
of 155 months while firms in “Non-Cyclical Services” have the lowest survival time of
79 months.
Panel C of Table 4 shows the survival rates during the first 5 years after listing for
the full sample. The first year survival rate for sample IPOs is 99% which falls to 69%
after 5 years of listing. This translates into a 31% delisting rate after 5 years of IPO and
is higher than the percentage of 20–28% for Europe’s main market recently reported
in Vismara et al. (2012). The 31% delisting rate is, however, lower than 41% for AIM
IPOs, reported in Espenlaub et al. (2012).
Table 5 breaks down the survival rates and time by different lockup lengths. In Panel
A, we stratify results by lockup length (i.e., lockup period greater than the median and
lockup period below the median length). The survival rates for 1, 3 and 5 years post-
IPO are consistently higher for lockups greater than the median compared to the
lockups lower than the median. For example, the 5 year survival rates for IPOs with
lockups greater than median lockup are 72% compared to the 67% survival rate for
16 This table is based on Kaplan Meier (KM) method which is a non-parametric approach of survival
analysis.
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Table 4
Kaplan Meier Survival Rates
Full Sample
Issue Year Observations 1 Yr 2 Yrs 3 Yrs 4 Yrs 5 Yrs Median ST
Panel A: Cumulative Survival Rates
1990 9 100 100 89 89 78 109
1991 9 100 100 89 89 89 136
1992 23 100 96 96 87 78 92
1993 61 100 95 92 82 75 88
1994 105 98 93 90 81 68 85
1995 48 100 90 81 69 63 75
1996 66 100 92 82 73 68 105
1997 57 100 88 79 74 67 106
1998 34 100 88 68 65 55 71
1999 24 96 92 87 83 83 99
2000 65 98 92 75 69 63 75
2001 6 100 100 83 83 50 51
2002 14 100 100 93 93 93 (111)
2003 6 100 100 100 100 67 (98)
2004 17 100 94 88 76 76 (87)
2005 16 100 88 75 56 56 71
2006 20 100 100 95 95 85 (61)
Panel B: Industry
Basic Industries 44 100 95 84 80 73 85
Cyclical Consumer Goods 36 100 100 89 75 64 75
Cyclical Services 185 99 93 84 76 67 99
Financials 60 97 95 87 72 65 82
General Industrials 41 100 88 83 78 70 90
Information Technology 89 100 91 84 80 72 95
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 78 99 91 82 76 73 92
Non-Cyclical Services 21 100 86 81 67 62 79
Resources 26 100 96 92 92 76 155
Panel C: Full Sample
Total 580 99 93 84 77 69 92
Note:
This table shows the cumulative survival rates for sample IPOs calculated using the Kaplan Meier (KM)
method for each of 1 to 5 years after the IPO. Based on the survival rates, we also show the median survival
times in months (Median ST). Median ST indicates the number of months after which half of the sample
IPOs have been delisted (the cumulative survival rate has dropped below 50%). The survival rates and
median survival times are reported separately for listing years (Panel A), for industry sectors (Panel B) and
for full sample (Panel C). In Panel A, figures in parentheses show the minimum survival times since the
median survival time could not be estimated. Minimum Survival Time (ST) is the time remaining from the
issue year until the end of the study period (December 2011) and shows that cumulative survival rates up to
the end of December 2011 have not yet dropped below 50%.
IPOs with lockups lower than the median lockup length. The cumulative survival rates
for firms with average lockup length above the median are higher in six out of nine
industries. Overall, sample firms with a longer lockup period survive longer compared
to their counterparts with the shorter lockups. Panel B provides survival rates and
times of the full sample over three different lockup periods (i.e., up to 12 months, 13
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to 24 months, and lockups greater than 24 months). Similar to the results observed in
Panel A, the survival rates are consistently higher for firms with longer lockup periods.
For example, IPOs with lockups greater than 24 months experience higher 5 year
survival rates comparedto the IPOs with 12 months lockups (77% vs. 67%). Firms
going public with a lockup period of more than 24 months, add 52 months to their
survival time compared to the survival time for firms with 12 months lockup. The log
rank test for equality of survival rates rejects the null hypothesis of equal survival rates
across the three lockup periods, at the 5% level of significance. Overall, results from
Table 5 lend strong support to our hypothesis regarding importance of lockups’ length
for the IPO survival.
(iii) Delisting and Failure Rates
In Table 6, we report numbers and percentages of survivors and delisted firms across
different delisting reasons and industry sectors during the first 5 years after the IPO.
Survivors are the firms that continue to be traded as of December 31, 2011 or transfer
to other markets (exclusively to AIM in our case). The main delisting types are Mergers
& Acquisitions (M&A), Administration/Liquidation (including receivership and vol-
untary liquidations) and other delisting reasons (permanent suspension/cancellation
of trading, other reasons etc.) M&A account for 25% of the 31% failure (delisting)
rate within 5 years after the IPOs. Only 32% of all the firms listed on LSE Official
List during 1990–2006 are still listed by the end of December 2011. Failure rates due
to more negative delisting reasons i.e., administration/liquidation, receivership and
cancellation of listing are just 6% during the first 5 years after IPO and 12% for the
full sample period (Panel A). Highest survival rates and lowest M&A delistings are
observed for the “Resources” sector (Panel B). More than 60% of the firms in Basic
industries and Financial sectors are delisted due to M&A activity over the full sample
period.
Table 7 shows the failure rates across delisting reasons and lockup lengths. In Panel
A, we report 1 year, 3 year and 5 year failure rates for IPOs with lockups above and
below the median lockup length by different delisting reasons. Panel B shows the
failure rates across different delisting types for three categories of lockup periods (up
to 12 months, 13 to 24 months, and lockups greater than 24 months). The 1, 3 and
5 year post-IPO failure rates due to mergers and acquisitions are not much different
across various lengths of lockup, although failure rates decrease with increase in the
length of lockup. The most notable differences in failure rates, however, are observed
for the more negative delisting reasons (i.e., administration/liquidations and other
delisting). The failure rates for longer lengths of lockup are consistently lower than
the failure rates for shorter lockups across the administration/liquidations and other
delisting reasons. For example, none of the IPOs with lockups longer than 24 months
were delisted due to administration/liquidations and other delisting reasons. These
results provide further support to our conjecture that longer lockups signal quality
and better survival prospects of the issuing firms.
(iv) Determinants of IPOs Survival
The estimation results from the AFT model are presented in Table 8. We present both
the coefficient estimates and the time ratios along with the associated p-values.
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Table 8
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model
Variables Coeff. p-value Time Ratio
Lockup Period 0.020*** 0.006 1.020
Ln (Size) 0.097*** 0.008 1.102
Ln (Age) 0.117** 0.020 1.124
Initial Returns 0.001 0.573 1.001
Insider Ownership 0.004* 0.090 1.004
Sponsor Reputation −0.016 0.253 0.984
Hot Issue Returns −0.008** 0.047 0.992
Leverage −0.096 .638 0908
PEVC −0.192** 0.040 0.826
Industry Dummies
Basic Industries 0.404 0.138 1.498
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.157 0.569 1.170
Cyclical Services 0.153 0.500 1.165
Financials −0.085 0.735 0.918
General Industrials 0.192 0.479 1.221
Information Technology 0.143 0.553 1.154
Non−Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.156 0.518 1.169
Resources 0.583* 0.058 1.791
Constant 3.548 0.000
Log−likelihood −566.380
LR(Prob.>chi)2 40.21***
Pseudo R2 0.113
Time at Risk 47,065.9
N 509
Note:
This table shows the estimation results of the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The lognormal density
distribution was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in
Table 1. Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes
in covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one
indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R2 was estimated as
R2 = 1 − Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo
corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Overall, our model exhibits reasonable explanatory power, measured by pseudo
R2 and statistically significant likelihood ratio. The results show a positive impact of
lockup period on the survival time. The coefficient on the lockup variable is positive
and highly significant with a p-value of 0.006. The time ratio of 1.020 associated with
the lockup period means that for a 1 month increase in lockup period, the survival
time increases by a factor of 1.020 or by 2%. The results regarding IPO size and
its impact on post-IPO survival are in line with our expectations and suggest that
larger IPOs are more likely to survive longer and have higher survival rates. We find
a beneficial but small effect of size on the aftermarket survival in line with the widely
documented size effect in earlier studies (Ritter, 1991; Schultz, 1993). An increase of
1% in the size of IPO increases the survival time by 0.1%.17 Age of the IPO firm has
17 In other words, the time ratio of Ln(Size) shows that survival time increases by a multiple of 1.102 as
Ln(Size) increases by one unit.
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a positive and significant impact on the survival. For example, post-issue survival time
increases by 0.12% for a 1% increase in the age of firm. The statistically insignificant
and small coefficient on initial returns shows no effect of initial returns on survival
of IPOs. Higher ownership retention by the insiders positively affects the survival
of IPOs. However, the coefficient is weakly statistically significant with a small effect
on survival (e.g., 1% increase in the insider ownership increases the survival time
by 0.4%). Contrary to Bhattacharya et al. (2013) and Espenlaub et al. (2012), we
find an insignificant effect of sponsor reputation on survival. The coefficient of hot
issue returns is negative (as expected) and statistically significant. The survival time
decreases by 0.8% for a 1% increase in hot issue returns. The negative relationship
between hot market proxy and IPO survival is consistent with Espenlaub et al. (2012),
who find that IPOs issued during hot periods in UK market have significantly reduced
survival times. Our results also provide support to the argument that poor quality
firms take advantage of market sentiment and go public during hot periods in the
UK (Coakley et al., 2007). Moreover, Yung et al. (2008) report that US firms going
public in hot markets are much more likely to delist within 3 years than those in
cold markets. The results also show a negative but statistically insignificant effect of
leverage on IPO survival. We find that backing by PE or VC firms significantly reduces
the survival time of the issuing firms. The estimated time ratio for the variable PEVC is
0.826 which indicates that the survival time for IPOs backed by PE or VC reduces by
17.4% compared to IPOs without PE backing.18
Our results are in line with the finding of Kooli and Meknassi (2007) and Vismara
et al. (2012), who show that PE backed firms have a higher probability of being
acquired and delisted.19 PE backed sample firms may be more attractive to potential
acquirers due to the positive impact of PE or VC backing. An alternate explanation
could be the short-term focus and/or grandstanding of PE firms (Gompers, 1996). For
example, Jelic (2011) shows that a significant number of PE backed buy-outs exit early
in the AIM market. Finally, we find a positive and significant (although weak) industry
effect on survival time of issuing firms. IPO firms from the Resources sector have
much higher survival probability compared to the firms in Non-Cyclical Services.20
The results about significant industry effects are consistent with the findings reported
for US IPOs in Hensler et al.(1997).
We further perform a sensitivity analysis of the predicted median survival time
in response to changes in lockup period based on the coefficient estimates from
Table 8. The results of the sensitivity or simulations of the survival time are reported
in Table 9. The table shows the expected survival time, absolute change in months
and the percentage change in expected survival time when the median lockup period
changes first by 1 month and then by quarterly intervals up to 12 months. We first
evaluate the predicted survival time at median (13 months) of lockup and means of all
other variables. The predicted median survival time equals 89 months.
The results show a significant impact of increase in lockup period on the survival
time. An increase of 12 months in the median lockup length causes an increase of
24 months in the post-IPO survival time (median survival time increases from 89 to
18 Similarly, results from our (unreported) marginal analysis suggest that predicted median survival time
decreases by 18 months for PE backed compared to non-PE backed IPOs at means of all other variables.
The results are available upon request from the authors.
19 This is plausible as most of the delistings in our sample are due to mergers and acquisitions.
20 These results are supported by our earlier analysis in Tables 5 and 7.
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Table 9
Sensitivity Analysis
Variable +12 +9 +6 +3 +1 Median Lockup –1 – 3 – 6 – 9 – 12
Expected Survival
Time (months)
113 106 100 94 91 89 87 84 79 75 70
Absolute Change
(months)
24 17 11 5 2 −2 −5 −10 −14 −19
Percentage Change
(%)
26.7 19.4 12.5 6.1 2.0 −1.9 −5.7 −11.1 −16.2 −21.0
Note:
This table shows the actual, absolute and percentage change in the predicted median survival time as the
lockup length varies by multiples of 1 to 12 months, holding all other variables at their mean values. The
changes to the predicted median survival time are calculated relative to the base predicted survival time
at median of lockup and means of all other independent variables. At median (13 months) of lockup and
means of all other independent variables, the predicted median survival time equals 89 months. This table
is based on AFT coefficient estimates in Table 8.
113 months). This translates into about 27% increase in the median survival time of
the issuing firms. Similarly a decrease of 12 months in the median lockup length causes
a 21% decline in the median survival time.21
5. ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
(i) Constant Hazard, Heterogeneity and Clustering
We re-estimate our AFT model with frailty which is introduced as an unobservable
multiplicative effect. The introduction of frailty in the survival model takes into
account the fact that all the issuing firms in our sample might not be homogenous
in terms of their delisting hazard (see Jenkins, 2005). The (unreported) results were
economically and statistically similar to our earlier results in Table 8 (i.e., without
frailty).22 We also consider our results adjusting for clustering standard errors since
we have high number of IPOs in some of the sample years. Again our results remain
robust to clustering based on IPO frequency in different years.23
In order to check the robustness of our results to the choice of different survival
estimation models, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model with the same
covariates. The Cox model makes no assumption about the underlying statistical
distribution and the baseline hazard function is estimated non-parametrically. Table 10
shows that our main results remain robust. The only exception is the insider ownership
variable and Resources sector which are no more statistically significant.
(ii) Regulatory Changes
Firms in certain industry sectors were required to have compulsory lockups for listing
on LSE prior to year 2000. For example, directors and other senior employees of
21 We obtain even more striking results when mean (instead of median) of the lockup period is used in the
analysis. The results are available upon request from authors.
22 The p-value for the likelihood ratio test of H0: θ = 0 is 0.145, where θ is the frailty parameter.
23 The unreported results are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 10
Cox Model
Variables Coeff. p-value Hazard Ratio
Lockup Period −0.024*** 0.006 0.976
Ln (Size) −0.120*** 0.009 0.887
Ln (Age) −0.116* 0.097 0.890
Initial Returns 0.000 0.885 1.000
Insider Ownership −0.003 0.293 0.997
Sponsor Reputation 0.020 0.248 1.021
Hot Issue Returns 0.014** 0.013 1.014
Leverage 0.013 0.963 1.013
PEVC 0.295** 0.019 1.343
Industry Dummies
Basic Industries −0.500 0.18 0.606
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.016 0.965 1.016
Cyclical Services −0.192 0.534 0.825
Financials 0.164 0.628 1.178
General Industrials −0.222 0.539 0.801
Information Technology −0.151 0.638 0.860
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods −0.097 0.764 0.907
Resources −0.684 0.123 0.504
Log-likelihood −1883.000
LR(Prob>chi)2 38.98***
Pseudo R2 0.093
Time at Risk 47065.9
N 509
Note:
This table shows the estimation results of Cox Proportional Hazard model. All variables are defined in
Table 1. The hazard ratio is calculated as the exponential of coefficient estimate, exp (β). A hazard ratio of
above (below) one indicates that increase in the explanatory variable increases (reduces) the failure rate.
Pseudo R2 was estimated as R2 = 1 − Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before
the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
mineral companies with less than 3 years of trading history were subject to compulsory
lockups for 2 years after the IPO. Similar restrictions were applicable to scientific
research based companies between years 1993 and 2000. Lockups have not been
obligatory for these companies since January 2000 but they have to include a statement
in their prospectus about lockups.24 We, therefore, test for robustness of our results
to the institutional changes in lockup requirements. First, we exclude mineral and
scientific research based companies floated before year 2000 from our sample. Second,
we exclude all companies with exactly 2 years of lockups from our sample. Unreported
results show that the main inferences are robust to excluding both types of sample
firms.
(iii) Alternative Measures of Explanatory Variables
We also check the robustness of results to different measurements and definitions
of some of the explanatory variables. For example, we use different variations of
24 Similar rules have been applicable to innovative high growth companies since January 2000. For a detail
of regulatory changes regarding compulsory lockups, see Espenlaub et al. (2001) pp.1,242–43.
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our proxy for measuring sponsor reputation. First, we employ a measure of sponsor
reputation similar to the one used by Jelic (2011) for PE firm reputation. The sponsor
reputation is calculated as an equally weighted average of rank scores based on
(i) the number of IPOs sponsored, and (ii) the amount sponsored in £ millions
during the sample period as a lead sponsor. Sponsor Reputation is a dummy variable
coded one for IPOs sponsored by the Top10 sponsors, and zero otherwise. Finally,
we follow the sponsor reputation measure used by Derrien and Kecske´s (2007) for
the UK market.25 Our (unreported) results are economically and statistically robust to
alternative measures of sponsors’ reputation.
6. CONCLUSION
Using a sample of 580 IPOs from 1990–2006, we examine the overall survival rates
(and times), delisting reasons and determinants of IPO survival focusing on lockup
length. Five year survival rate for our sample IPOs is 69% and the median survival time
over the entire sample period (1990–2011) is 92 months. The reported 31% delisting
rate, during the 5-year period after listing, is higher than reported for other European
markets (see Vismara et al., 2012). M&As account for one quarter, whilst failures
(administration, liquidations, receivership, and cancellations) account for only 6% of
all delistings in the first 5-year period. The failure rates for longer lengths of lockup
are consistently lower than the failure rates for shorter lockups regardless of delisting
reasons. Notably, none of the sample IPOs with lockups longer than 24months delisted
due to administration/liquidations. Furthermore, firms going public with a lockup
period of more than 24 months, add 52 months to their median survival time relative
to the survival time of their counterparts with 12 months lockups.
We provide empirical evidence that locking-in inside managers for longer periods
improves the long-term survival of IPO firms. A 12 month increase in median lockup
period increases the (median) survival time by 27%. The results are robust to different
survival estimation models, heterogeneity, clustering and alternative specification of
variables. The above results inform the recent debate about the alleged short-termism
of the UK equity market by lending support to recent recommendations which suggest
that directors’ remuneration should be based on long-term performance and provided
in the form of company shares to be held (locked-in) for a much longer period of time
(Kay, 2012; BBC, 2013; Deloitte, 2013).
Our results have important implications for IPO firms, investors and regulators.
Issuing firms for example, can signal long-term survival prospects through length
of lockups. Lockups’ characteristics thus can help investors assessing IPOs’ quality.
Regulators and policymakers concerned about the short-termism of equity markets
may consider longer lockups as a means to align managers’ interests with those of
investors in the long run.
25 See Derrien and Kecskes (2007), footnote 11, p. 460. All unreported results in this section are available
from the authors upon request.
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